

Message Text

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ORIGIN SP-02

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SS-15 AID-05 COME-00 EB-07 FRB-03

TRSE-00 XMB-02 OPIC-03 CIEP-01 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01

EUR-12 IO-13 FEA-01 DLOS-06 OES-06 NEA-10 AGR-05 /128 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:JWALKER:JRR

APPROVED BY S/P:WLORD

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O 281838Z SEP 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 240927

E.O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA, US

SUBJECT: US-JAPAN PLANNING TALKS: PAPERS

1. HERE IS THE US PAPER ON TOPIC ONE: FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR COLLABORATION AMONG THE ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES. IN PASSING TO JAPANESE, PLEASE ADD A TITLE PAGE WHICH INCLUDES THIS DISCLAIMER: QUOTE: THIS PAPER REFLECTS THE PERSONAL VIEWS OF A MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF. IT HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY CLEARED WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

2. COLLABORATION AMONG THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES: THE WESTERN EUROPEAN FACTOR

3. THE WHOLE NOTION OF TRILATERAL COLLABORATION STEMS FROM A RECOGNITION THAT THE FATES OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMO-
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CRACIES ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED: THAT EACH OF OUR OWN ECONOMIES DEPENDS CRUCIALLY ON THE HEALTH OF THE OTHERS, AND THAT OUR MOST PRESSING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS REQUIRE COMMON ACTION. FOR YEARS, GROWING COOPERATION BETWEEN

NORTH AMERICA, JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE HAS BEEN A CORNER-STONE OF GLOBAL PEACE AND THE ENGINE OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC

GROWTH. THE MILITARY STRENGTH AND POLITICAL COHESION OF NATO AND THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE HAVE BEEN CRITICAL ELEMENTS IN THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER. CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES HAS BEEN AND REMAINS A PRIME PREREQUISITE OF PROGRESS IN MANAGING ECONOMIC POLICY EFFECTIVELY IN OUR OWN COUNTRIES, IN ADJUSTING OUR RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND THE CENTRALLY-PLANNED ECONOMIES, AND IN REDUCING OUR COLLECTIVE VULNERABILITY TO SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS AND/OR PRICE GOUGING IN THE FIELDS OF ENERGY AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS. IN AN AGE OF UNDIMINISHED IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION, THE UNITED STATES WILL NEVER FORGET THAT ITSMOSTIMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS ARE WITH THOSE NATIONS WHICH SHARE OUR OWN COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND MARKET ECONOMIES.

4. OUR FUTURE ABILITY TO COLLABORATE ON A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WILL DEPEND FIRST ON THE HEALTH AND STABILITY OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRAICES THEMSELVES. ECONOMIC RECOVERY IS WELL UNDERWAY IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN AND--WHATEVER THE PROBLEMS OF PARTICULAR POLITICAL PARTIES OR LEADERS--OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS SEEM SECURE.

5. THE PICTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE, HOWEVER, IS MORE MIXED, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY. WE, THEREFORE, HAVE CHOSEN TO FOCUS OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE US-JAPANESE DISCUSSION OF PROSPECTS FOR TRILATERAL COLLABORATION ON THE EUROPEAN POINT OF OUR TRIANGLE.

6. EUROPEAN STRENGTHS

WESTERN EUROPE IS COMING OUT OF ITS WORST POSTWAR RECESSION SOBERED ABOUT ITS ECONOMIC FUTURE, BUT WITH ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS INTACT AND MODERATE FORCES STRENGTHENED. INDEED, THIS IS THE ONE AREA IN THE WORLD WHERE DEMOCRACY HAS BEEN GAINING GROUND. FREELY ELECTED PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS HAVE RETURNED TO GREECE AND PORTUGAL; MODERATES IN THE LATTER COUNTRY ESPECIALLY HAVE PROVED FAR MORE RESILIENT AND EFFECTIVE THAN MANY WERE PREDICTING 18 MONTHS AGO. SPAIN HAS ONLY BEGUN THE DIFFICULT BUSINESS OF CONTROLLED DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION, BUT ITS LEADERS HAVE SO FAR BEEN MORE SKILLED AND SUCCESSFUL--AND THE OPPOSITION MORE PATIENT AND RESPONSIBLE--THAN MANY EXPECTED.

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7. INFRANCE, SOCIALIST SUCCESSES, LARGELY AT COMMUNIST EXPENSE, HAVE GIVEN THE COUNTRY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS A CREDIBLE OPPOSITION WHICH IS NOT LED BY COMMUNISTS.

THIS IS NOT AN UNMIXED BLESSING FOR THE US. A SOCIALIST-DOMINATED LEFT, IF ONLY BECAUSE IT APPEARS LESS FRIGHTENING, HAS A BETTER CHANCE OF DEFEATING FRANCE'S PRESENT, RELATIVELY PRO-ATLANTIC, GOVERNMENT THAN A LEFT DOMINATED BY COMMUNISTS. BUT AT LEAST FRANCE HAS A CHANCE OF ESCAPING THE ITALIAN PREDICAMENT, WHERE THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION EXCEPT THAT OF THE COMMUNISTS. THE BRITISH LEFT SEEMS TO HAVE LOOKED OVER THE BRINK OF ECONOMIC DISASTER AND IS COOPERATING IN AN INTENSELY CONSERVATIVE, SURPRISINGLY DISCIPLINED PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY WHICH ENJOYS IMPRESSIVE POPULAR SUPPORT. POLITICIANS EVERYWHERE (INCLUDING, WHETHER "SINCERELY" OR NOT, MOST WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST LEADERS) SEEM TO THINK THAT THE ONLY WAY TO WIN VOTES IS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR MODERATION AND THEIR DEVOTION TO DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES.

8. WEST EUROPEANS ARE SHOWING A GROWING SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROSPERITY AND STABILITY OF THEIR OWN REGION AND AN ABILITY TO ACT TOGETHER ACROSS NATIONAL LINES--WHETHER AS GROUPS OF SOCIALIST OR CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, OR AS LABOR UNIONS, OR AS GOVERNMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY--TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC FORCES, ESPECIALLY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE. BEYOND EUROPE, THE EC'S TREND TOWARD SPEAKING WITH A SINGLE VOICE ON MOST ECONOMIC ISSUES (AND THE INCREASINGLY ECONOMIC NATURE OF MANY POLITICAL PROBLEMS) IS MAKING WESTERN EUROPE A MORE EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL PLAYER.

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9. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS NOT MOVING TOWARD THE SUPRANATIONALISM ENVISIONED BY ITS FOUNDERS. INDEED, THE UNEVEN NATURE OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY AMONG THE NINE HAS SET BACK HOPES FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. (PROBLEMS OF DIVERGENCE AMONG EC MEMBERS WILL BE AGGRAVATED IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THE COMMUNITY EVENTUALLY EXPANDS TO TAKE IN GREECE, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.) BUT THE SAME EXTERNAL ECONOMIC SHOCKS WHICH HAVE MADE FURTHER INTEGRATION MORE DIFFICULT HAVE GIVEN EUROPEANS A RENEWED SENSE OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN SUCH UNITY AS THEY HAVE ACHIEVED, AND TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS BY ACTING AS A UNIT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE.

10. JOINT ACTION AT SUCH INTERNATIONAL FORA AS THE CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION, THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS; THE LOME CONVENTION FOR STRENGTHENED ECONOMIC TIES WITH A VARIETY OF RAW MATERIALS PRODUCERS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD; AND THE PRELIMINARY EFFORTS NOW UNDER WAY TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND THE ARAB WORLD OR THE CEMA STATES, ARE THE MOST VISIBLE SIGNS OF THIS SENSE THAT EUROPEAN INTERESTS ARE A

SPECIAL CASE, EVEN WITHIN THE LARGER GROUPING OF

INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES, AND THAT THOSE INTERESTS REQUIRE JOINT ACTION. THE RESULTING SENSE OF COUNTING FOR MORE IN THE WORLD, OF HAVING GREATER INFLUENCE ON ISSUES WHICH AFFECT EUROPEAN INTERESTS, IN TURN REINFORCES POLITICAL CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY AT HOME.

11. . . . AND WEAKNESSES

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME FLAWS IN THIS GENERALLY POSITIVE PICTURE. EVEN WITH THE RECESSION ENDING, FEW EXPECT A RETURN TO THE PATTERN OF RELATIVELY STEADY ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH LOW INFLATION AND LOW UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH HAD BECOME THE NORM BEFORE 1973. CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS WHICH HAD UNDERPINNED THE WAY POLITICAL ISSUES WERE DEFINED AND DEBATED ARE THREATENING TO UNDERMINE ESTABLISHED POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS. DISSATISFACTION WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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OLD FORMULAS AND PARTIES IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE WELL-ADVERTISED RISE OF LEFTIST STRENGTH IN SOUTHERN EUROPE, BUT ALSO POSSIBLY TO AN ANTI-WELFARE STATE, CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE IN NORTH EUROPEAN STATES WHICH IN RECENT YEARS HAVE BEEN RUN BY SOCIALISTS. IN SUM, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO OVERT ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY AS SUCH IN WESTERN EUROPE, ESTABLISHED PARTIES AND POLITICAL PATTERNS ARE VERY MUCH UNDER CHALLENGE.

12. FURTHERMORE, THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY ITSELF IS STILL VERY PRECARIOUS IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN STATES, AND THE POLITICAL INSECURITY OF GOVERNMENTS IS COMPLICATING EFFORTS TO MANAGE IT. THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY HAS ITSELF EXACERBATED ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL; MODERATE GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE COMPETING WITH COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR THE LOYALTY OF TRADE UNIONISTS HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC AUSTERITY PROGRAMS WHICH MIGHT HAVE MITIGATED THE EFFECTS OF OIL PRICE RISES (AND, IN THE CASE OF PORTUGAL, OF THE LOSS OF AFRICAN POSSESSIONS AND THE RETURN OF PORTUGUESE SETTLERS FROM THOSE TERRITORIES).

13. IN BRITAIN AND ITALY, EXTERNAL ECONOMIC SHOCKS HAVE ONLY BROUGHT TO A BOIL SOME LONG-STANDING AND SEVERE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WHICH WILL TAKE YEARS TO CURE--AND WILL TEST MODERATE FORCES TO THE LIMIT, AS WORKERS ARE ASKED TO ACCEPT A LOWER STANDARD OF LIVING IN ORDER TO INCREASE INDUSTRIAL PROFITS. FRANCE, WHERE INFLATION IS RUNNING AT 10-12 A YEAR AND THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS UNSURE OF HOW TO DEAL WITH IT WHILE TRYING TO STAVE OFF A LEFTIST CHALLENGE, MAY BE THE NEXT EUROPEAN ECONOMY ON THE CRITICAL LIST.

14. PERHAPS MOST TROUBLESOME OF ALL IN OUR INVENTORY OF

WEAK SPOTS IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGERS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE HAVE VERY DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK AND VALUES FROM THOSE WHICH HERETOFORE HAVE BOUND THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES TOGETHER. WE OF COURSE HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE DEPTH OF THESE PARTIES' COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES AND THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH DOUBTS, WHICH ARE SHARED BY NON-COMMUNIST FORCES THROUGHOUT EUROPE, INEVITABLY WOULD INTRODUCE A DEGREE OF SUSPICION AND ACRIMONY INTO DOMESTIC AND INTRA-CONFIDENTIAL

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EUROPEAN POLITICS, AS WELL AS INTO TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONS SHOULD COMMUNIST PARTIES COME TO SHARE POWER IN SOME WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. BUT EVEN IF WE COULD TAKE AT FACE VALUE THE MODERATE RHETORIC OF WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST LEADERS, AND ASSUME THE BEST IN TERMS OF THEIR RESPONSIBLE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AT HOME, THEIR INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK AND VALUES WOULD REMAIN QUITE DIFFERENT FROM OURS. THEY WOULD NOT GIVE THE SAME PRIORITY WE DO TO MAINTAINING WESTERN DEFENSES. MOREOVER, THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD FOR INSTANCE, THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE, OR NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC RELATIONS, OR EC-CEMA DEALINGS, OR A RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, WOULD MAKE THEM DIFFICULT PARTNERS FOR OTHER WEST EUROPEANS AS WELL AS FOR US. COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS OBVIOUSLY WOULD AFFECT AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD BOTH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATO.

15. EUROPE AND 'INTERDEPENDENCE'

THIS ARRAY OF INTERNAL PROBLEMS IS LIKELY TO PREOCCUPY WEST EUROPEAN LEADERS FOR SOME YEARS TO COME. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT EUROPEANS WILL BE "ISOLATIONIST," IN THE CLASSIC SENSE OF THE TERM. QUITE THE CONTRARY: AS WE NOTE EARLIER IN THIS PAPER, BECAUSE SO MANY OF EUROPE'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE AT ROOT ECONOMIC, AND BECAUSE THEIR ECONOMIES ARE SO VULNERABLE TO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, EUROPEAN LEADERS ARE IF ANYTHING MORE OUTWARD LOOKING THAN DURING THE PROSPEROUS 1960S AND EARLY 1970S. BUT THE COMPLEX ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PICTURE WITHIN WESTERN EUROPE INEVITABLY WILL AFFECT HOW IT WORKS WITH THE U.S. AND JAPAN ON THE PROBLEMS WE SHARE.

16. FOR INSTANCE: WE ARE NOT FAR APART ON THE ISSUES CONFRONTING US AT THE CIEC. BUT THE EC'S GREATER DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED RAW MATERIALS MAKES MOST OF ITS MEMBERS FEEL A NEED TO APPEAR MORE FORTHCOMING TO LDC DEMANDS, AT LEAST IN RHETORIC AND IN THE ENDORSEMENT OF VAGUE PRINCIPLES. MOREOVER, THE NATURE OF THE EC AT TIMES MAKES IT A DIFFICULT PARTNER IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE DETERMINATION OF ITS NINE MEMBERS TO SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE, AND THE CUMBERSOME NATURE OF THE INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

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OF THIS COMMUNITY WHICH STILL IS AN ASSOCIATION OF STATES RATHER THAN A STATE ITSELF, MAKES IT HARD FOR COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES TO DEAL FLEXIBLY WITH THE REST OF US. (WE HAVE HAD SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES WITH EC BEHAVIOR IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE DEFENSIVENESS ABOUT THE COMMUNITY'S COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY ADDS TO THE DIFFICULTY OF THE EC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS TO COMPLICATE RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.)

17. THAT HAVING BEEN SAID, THE OVERALL RECORD OF TRILATERAL COLLABORATION IS REALLY VERY GOOD. IN FACT, EUROPE'S INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES MAKE ITS GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION ON A RANGE OF ISSUES ALL THE MORE STRIKING. GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE AND VARIETY OF PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BESET US IN THE LAST HALF DOZEN YEARS OR SO, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF THOSE PROBLEMS HAVE DRAMATIZED THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICA'S ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE ONE HAND, AND THOSE OF WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN ON THE OTHER, THE IMPRESSIVE THING IS HOW WELL WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN WORKING TOGETHER. IN MANY CASES IT WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS FALLING-OUT AMONG THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES THAT SHOCKED US INTO NEW EFFORTS AT COLLABORATION.

18. WE CAN ALL BE PROUD OF HAVING GOT THROUGH THE RECENT RECESSION WITHOUT RESORTING TO PROTECTIONIST MEASURES WHICH MIGHT HAVE WON SHORT-TERM POPULARITY WITH OUR ELECTORATES, BUT ULTIMATELY WOULD HAVE MADE OUR COMMON PROBLEMS FAR WORSE. THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS; THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY; THE ECONOMIC SUMMITS AND INTENSIFIED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION TO THE WORK OF THE OECD; AND G-8 COORDINATION FOR OUR PARTICIPATION IN CIEC, ALL REPRESENT THE PRACTICAL STAFFING OUT OF "INTERDEPENDENCE"

19. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

-- WHAT IS THE PRESENT STATE OF EUROPEAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS? WHAT MODES OF COOPERATION/CONSULTATION ARE USED AND HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY?

-- HOW DOES JAPAN SEE THE POSSIBILITIES, AND THE LIMITS ON FURTHER COLLABORATION AMONG THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES?

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CIES, AND ESPECIALLY BETWEEN ITSELF AND WESTERN EUROPE?

-- WHAT ARE THE POLITICAL/SECURITY ISSUES IN WHICH JAPAN HAS A SENSE OF COMMON INTEREST WITH WESTERN EUROPE? WHAT CONTRIBUTION DOES JAPAN THINK WESTERN EUROPE MIGHT

MAKE TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE ASIAN OR PACIFIC
BASIN REGION? DOES TOKYO SEE ANY CHALLENGE TO ITS INTERESTS
FROM THE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL/SECURITY PICTURE?
-- HOW FORMAL A TRILATERAL CONNECTION IS DESIRABLE
AMONG US, ASSUMING A COMMON INTEREST ON INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL/SECURITY ISSUES? WOULD ANY PURPOSE BE SERVED BY
FORMALIZING COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC-SECURITY CON-
SULTATIONS AMONG NORTH AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE, AND JAPAN,
ALONG THE LINES EITHER OF THE ORIGINAL "YEAR OF EUROPE"
PROPOSAL, OR THE MORE INSTITUTIONALIZED PROPOSAL IN THE
RECENT PAPER WRITTEN FOR THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION BY
FORMER AMBASSADORS USHIBA, ORTONA, AND SCHAETZEL?

-- THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES
REMAINS CENTRAL TO ALL OUR OTHER ENDEAVORS, AND NO ONE
QUESTIONS THE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF OUR ECONOMIES. AT THE
OECD AND AT ECONOMIC SUMMITS WE HAVE MADE REAL PROGRESS
TOWARD BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S ECONOMIC PLANS
AND EXPECTATIONS. THIS SHOULD HELP EACH OF US MAKE WISER
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DECISIONS. BUT THESE DECISIONS REMAIN
NATIONAL. HOW MUCH FURTHER CAN WE EXPECT TO GO -- OR DO
WE NEED TO GO -- IN FURTHER COORDINATION OF OUR ECONOMIC
POLICIES? HOW DOES TOKYO VIEW WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
PRACTICES, AS THEY AFFECT THE OVERALL HEALTH OF THE INDUS-
TRIALIZED STATES?

-- TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE STILL-TROUBLED OECD ECONOMIES
-- ITALY, THE U.K., SPAIN, PORTUGAL -- SUSCEPTIBLE TO OUT-
SIDE HELP? WHAT DEGREE OF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES SHOULD
THE REST OF US BE PREPARED TO TOLERATE FROM ANY OF THEM
-- AND AT WHAT PRICE IN THEIR GIVING US A VOICE IN THEIR
NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES?

-- AT THE RAMBOUILLET SUMMIT IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT
CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE MAJOR
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES IS ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFICIENT
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FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. ARE
THESE PATTERNS OF COLLABORATION DEVELOPING SATISFACTORILY
BETWEEN JAPAN AND EUROPE AND THE U.S., OR DO WE NEED TO
TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNICATION?

-- HOW DOES TOKYO VIEW ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF THE OECD
STATES IN GENERAL? ARE WE RELATIVELY SANGUINE ABOUT OUR
OWN PROSPECTS, AND PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN CONTROLLING
CHANGE IN NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC DEALINGS? OR IS THERE SOME
THING MORE AMBITIOUS WE SHOULD BE AIMING FOR AT CIEC? KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 16 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PAPERS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PLANNING MEETINGS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 SEP 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: BoyleJA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE240927
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/P:JWALKER:JRR
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760365-1285
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197609108/baaaegqx.tel
Line Count: 377
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SP
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: BoyleJA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 MAY 2004 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <23 SEP 2004 by BoyleJA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-JAPAN PLANNING TALKS: PAPERS
TAGS: PFOR, JA, US, XG, XS
To: TOKYO
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006